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Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions
by the Pharmaceutical and Health Product Industry
in the United States, 1999-2018
Olivier J. Wouters, PhD
IMPORTANCE Government efforts to lower drug costs and other legislative and regulatory
initiatives may be counteracted by campaign donors and lobbyists in the pharmaceutical and
health product industry.
OBJECTIVE To review howmuchmoney the pharmaceutical and health product industry
spent on campaign contributions and lobbying in the US from 1999 to 2018 at the federal and
state levels.
DESIGN AND SETTING Analysis of federal-level and state-level data obtained from the Center
for Responsive Politics and the National Institute onMoney in Politics, respectively. These
nonprofit, nonpartisan organizations track federal and state campaign contributions and
lobbying expenditures by individuals and groups.
EXPOSURES Lobbying expenditures and contributions to political campaigns.
MAIN OUTCOMES ANDMEASURES Total spending, inflation adjusted to 2018 dollars using the
US Consumer Price Index, on lobbying and campaign contributions by year, source, and state.
RESULTS From 1999 to 2018, the pharmaceutical and health product industry recorded $4.7
billion—an average of $233million per year—in lobbying expenditures at the federal level,
more than any other industry. Of the spending, the trade group Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America accounted for $422million (9.0%), and the other 19 top
companies and organizations in this industry accounted for $2.2 billion (46.8%). The industry
spent $414million on contributions to candidates in presidential and congressional elections,
national party committees, and outside spending groups. Of this amount, $22million went to
presidential candidates and $214million went to congressional candidates. Of the 20
senators and 20 representatives who received themost contributions, 39 belonged to
committees with jurisdiction over health-related legislative matters, 24 of them in senior
positions. The industry contributed $877million to state candidates and committees, of
which $399million (45.5%) went to recipients in California and $287million (32.7%) went to
recipients in 9 other states. In years in which key state referenda on reforms in drug pricing
and regulation were being voted on, there were large spikes in contributions to groups that
opposed or supported the reforms.
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE From 1999 to 2018, the pharmaceutical and health product
industry spent large sums of money on lobbying and campaign contributions to influence
legislative and election outcomes. These findings can inform discussions about how to
temper the influence of industry on US health policy.
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I
n 2018, the US spent an estimated $3.6 trillion, or 17.6% of
its $20.5-trilliongrossdomesticproduct, onhealthcare, in-
cluding $345 billion on prescription drugs sold in retail
pharmacies.1 Adjusted for inflation, per-person spending on
prescriptiondrugs sold inUS retail pharmacies increased from
$520 in 1999 to $1025 in 2017.2Although bothDemocrats and
Republicans consider lowering prescription drug prices a
priority,3 lobbyists and campaign donors in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry may counteract efforts by federal and state gov-
ernments to decrease these costs.
In the US, citizens and organizations, including corpora-
tions, have the right to petition politicians and elected offi-
cials to try to influence policy decisions.4 Citizens and orga-
nizationsmaydoso individuallyorcollectively throughinterest
groups. They can exert their influence through lobbying
(ie, contacts bypaid lobbyistswithofficials or their staff todis-
seminate information about regulatory or legislative
matters).4,5 Apart from lobbying, individuals and organiza-
tions may contribute money to political campaigns to sup-
port theirpreferredcandidatesand improve their access tosuc-
cessful candidates.6-8 Campaign contributions and lobbying
expenditures differ andare subject todifferent regulations.8,9
There is evidence that campaign contributions and lob-
bying expenditures may influence election and legislative
outcomes.10-15However, fewstudieshaveanalyzedsuchspend-
ing by the pharmaceutical and health product industry,
andmost of the research is from 2009 or earlier.16-22 Prior re-
search has primarily focused on lobbying and campaign con-
tributions by the health care sector as a whole in individual
years at the federal level. Trends over time have received less
attention, as have contributions to candidates and commit-
tees in state elections, where money may be used to influ-
ence the outcomes of referenda onmeasures aimed at lower-
ing drug costs.
This study analyzed lobbying expenditures and patterns
of election contributions by the pharmaceutical and health
product industry at the federal and state levels from 1999 to
2018.
Methods
Federal-level andstate-level datawereobtained fromtheCen-
ter for Responsive Politics23 and the National Institute on
Money in Politics,24 respectively. These nonprofit, nonparti-
san organizations track federal and state campaign contribu-
tions and lobbying expenditures by individuals and groups.
Both organizations categorized all contributions and ex-
penditures by sector and industrywithin each sector; the cat-
egories were modeled on the federal government’s standard
industrial classificationsystem.Thepharmaceuticalandhealth
product industry includes manufacturers of pharmaceutical
andbiological products, diagnostic tests,medical devices and
equipment, and nutritional and dietary supplements as well
as pharmacy benefit managers.
On September 30, 2019, the databases of the 2 organiza-
tions were searched for campaign contributions and lobby-
ing expenditures by individuals and groups in the pharma-
ceutical and health product industry from January 1, 1999, to
December 31, 2018. State-level data on campaign contribu-
tions from January 1, 1999, to December 31, 2002, were in-
complete for somestatesowing to lackof reporting.Asnodata
werecollected fromhumanparticipantsandthedatawerepub-
licly available, the study was exempt from institutional re-
view board approval at the London School of Economics and
Political Science.
Federal-Level Data
Data on lobbying expenditures were based on disclosure re-
ports filedwith the SenateOffice of Public Records. Lobbying
firms are required to provide the office with quarterly esti-
mates of lobbying incomes (rounded to the nearest $10000)
from clients who spent $3000 ormore in a given quarter. Or-
ganizations that hire lobbyists as direct employees are re-
quired to report lobbying-related expenditures to the nearest
$10000 if outlays were $12 500 or more in a given quarter.23
The data on election campaign contributions were based
ondisclosure reports filedwith theFederal ElectionCommis-
sion.Fromthese reports, theCenter forResponsivePolitics ex-
tracted all records of (1) cash contributions of $200ormore to
federal candidates and national party committees from indi-
vidual donors andpolitical action committees; (2) softmoney
contributions fromindividuals, corporations, laborunions,and
ideological groups to national party committees; and (3) do-
nations to outside spending groups, which operate indepen-
dently of and not in coordination with candidates’ commit-
teesandcanspendmoneyoncommunicationswith thepublic.
Soft money contributions from individuals, corporations, la-
bor unions, and ideological groups to national party commit-
tees are donations that cannot be used to directly support the
election bids of federal candidates but rather fund other ini-
tiatives, such as voter registration drives.16
In2002, theBipartisanCampaignReformAct25bannedsoft
money contributions but allowed donations to state and lo-
cal political parties for use in activities related to voter regis-
Key Points
Question Howmuchmoney did the pharmaceutical and health
product industry spend on lobbying and campaign contributions in
the US from 1999 to 2018?
Findings This observational study, which analyzed publicly
available data on campaign contributions and lobbying in the US
from 1999 to 2018, found that the pharmaceutical and health
product industry spent $4.7 billion, an average of $233million per
year, on lobbying the US federal government; $414million on
contributions to presidential and congressional electoral
candidates, national party committees, and outside spending
groups; and $877million on contributions to state candidates and
committees. Contributions were targeted at senior legislators in
Congress involved in drafting health care laws and state
committees that opposed or supported key referenda on drug
pricing and regulation.
Meaning An understanding of the large sums of money the
pharmaceutical and health product industry spends on lobbying
and campaign contributions can inform discussions about how to
temper the influence of industry on US health policy.
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tration and participation in federal elections, known as Levin
funds.Congress acted in response to concerns that softmoney
contributions,whichwerenot subject to federal limitsoncam-
paign contributions,were beingmisappropriated.16The 2010
Supreme Court case of Citizens United v Federal Election
Commission
26 (and related court decisions) legalized contri-
butions by corporations and unions to new types of outside
spending groups, including so-called super political action
committees. Prior to the ruling, no donations to these groups
were recorded; the ban on soft money contributions re-
mained in effect.
For eachof the20senators and20 representativeswho re-
ceived the most contributions from the pharmaceutical and
health product industry from 1999 to 2018, records from the
US Government Publishing Office27 were searched to deter-
minewhether thesemembers served at any point during this
periodonacommitteewith jurisdictionoverhealth-related leg-
islativematters, ahealth-related subcommitteeofoneof these
committees, or both.27 It was also noted if a member served
as chair, vice chair, or ranking member of any of these com-
mittees or subcommittees or held a party leadership position
(Speaker of the House, majority leader, minority leader, ma-
joritywhip, orminoritywhip in theHouse; president pro tem-
pore, majority leader, minority leader, majority whip, or mi-
nority whip in the Senate). Some committees and
subcommittees changed names over the study period.
For theHouseofRepresentatives, thecommitteeswereEn-
ergy and Commerce; Ways and Means; Oversight and Re-
form;Budget; Education andLabor; Appropriations; andVet-
erans’ Affairs. For the Senate, the committees were Finance;
Aging (Special Committee); Budget; Health, Education, La-
bor, and Pensions; Appropriations; and Veterans’ Affairs.
The subcommittees included in theHousewere (1)Health
(Energy and Commerce); (2) Health (Ways and Means); (3)
HealthCare,Benefits, andAdministrativeRules (Oversightand
Reform); (4) Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions (Edu-
cation and Labor); (5) Agriculture, Rural Development, Food
and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies (Appropria-
tions); (6) Labor,Health andHumanServices, Education, and
Related Agencies (Appropriations); (7) Department of Veter-
ans’ Affairs (Appropriations); and (8) Health (Veterans’ Af-
fairs). In the Senate, the subcommittees were (1) Health Care
(Finance); (2)PrimaryHealthandRetirementSecurity (Health,
Education, Labor, andPensions); (3) Agriculture, RuralDevel-
opment, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agen-
cies (Appropriations); (4) Labor, Health andHuman Services,
Education,andRelatedAgencies (Appropriations); and (5)Mili-
taryConstruction,Veterans’Affairs, andRelatedAgencies (Ap-
propriations).
State-Level Data
Data on lobbying expenditures at the state levelwereunavail-
able for most states and thus were excluded from the analy-
sis.However, theNational InstituteonMoney inPolitics24 col-
lects data from all 50 states on campaign contributions from
individualsandorganizations in thepharmaceutical andhealth
product industry to the following state-level candidates and
committees: (1) gubernatorial or other statewide candidates;
(2) house, assembly, or senate candidates; (3) supreme court
candidates; (4) political party committees; and (5) ballotmea-
surecommittees.Ballotmeasurecommittees raise funds toop-
pose or support ballotmeasures,which are proposals that are
votedonbytheelectorate topassor repeal state lawsoramend-
ments to the state constitution.28 The National Institute on
Money in Politics24 acquires the data fromvarious state regu-
latory offices.
Data Analysis
Descriptive statisticswere used to report total campaign con-
tributions and lobbying expenditures by the pharmaceutical
andhealthproduct industry,with resultsbrokendownbyyear,
source, recipient,politicalparty, andstate.For comparison, ag-
gregated data on federal lobbying expenditures by the top 10
industries andorganizationswere also collected, asweredata
on expenditures by the 4 industries in the health sector in ad-
dition to the pharmaceutical and health product industry (ie,
hospitals andnursinghomes, healthprofessionals, health ser-
vices and health maintenance organizations, and miscella-
neous health organizations). Because health insurance com-
panies aregroupedwith life, property, andcar insurance firms,
theywereexcludedfromthehealthsector for thisanalysis.Fed-
eral campaign contributionswere recordedover 2-year cycles,
reflecting the timing of congressional elections.
All dollar figures were inflation adjusted to 2018 dollars
using the US Consumer Price Index. Stata version 15 (Stata-
Corp) and Excel 2016 (Microsoft) were used for all analyses.
Results
Federal-Level Lobbying Expenditures
From 1999 to 2018, across all industries, a total of $64.3 bil-
lion was spent lobbying Congress and federal agencies in the
US. During this time, the pharmaceutical and health product
industry recorded the highest spending of all industries ($4.7
billion [7.3%]), followed by the insurance industry ($3.2 bil-
lion [5.0%]), theelectricutilities industry ($2.8billion [4.4%]),
and the electronics manufacturing and equipment industry
($2.6 billion [4.0%]). Within the health sector, total lobbying
expenditures were $9.7 billion. Expenditures in addition to
thoseby thepharmaceutical andhealthproduct industrywere
recordedbyhospitals andnursinghomes ($1.9 billion), health
care professionals ($1.7 billion), health services and health
maintenance organizations ($1.3 billion), and miscellaneous
health organizations ($139 million).
Pharmaceutical andhealth product industry spending on
federal lobbying averaged $233millionper year. From1999 to
2009,annual spending increased,beforedecreasingbrieflyand
increasing again (Figure 1). Expenditures peaked at $318 mil-
lion in 2009, the year before the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act was signed into law.
Over the 20-year study period, 1375 organizations in the
pharmaceutical and health product industry reported lobby-
ing expenditures. Seventeenof the 20highest spending orga-
nizations were manufacturers of biological or pharmaceuti-
cal products or their trade associations (Table 1). The other 3
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organizations were the Advanced Medical Technology Asso-
ciation (a trade association for medical device companies),
Medtronic (a medical device company), and the Seniors Co-
alition (an interest group that does not disclose its donors and
lobbies for limitedgovernment intervention indrugandhealth
care markets). The top spender, the trade group Pharmaceu-
tical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), ac-
counted for $422 million (9.0%) of the $4.7 billion, and the
other 19 top spenders accounted for $2.2 billion (46.8%).
Across all industries, only 5 organizations reported more
spending thanPhRMA: theUSChamberofCommerce ($1.7 bil-
lion), the National Association of Realtors ($602million), the
American Medical Association ($462 million), the American
HospitalAssociation ($426million), andGeneralElectric ($423
million). Following PhRMA, the seventh and eighth ranked
spenderswere theBlueCrossBlueShieldAssociation ($391mil-
lion) andAARP (formerlyAmericanAssociationofRetiredPer-
sons) ($334million). Thus, 5 of 8 organizations with the larg-
est lobbying expenditures were health care related.
Federal-Level Campaign Contributions
From1999 to2018, thepharmaceutical andhealthproduct in-
dustry contributed $414 million to federal (presidential and
congressional) candidates,nationalpartycommittees, andout-
side spending groups (Figure 2). This included $152million in
contributions from individuals affiliatedwith the health care
industry, $165 million from political action committees, and
$96million in softmoney contributions anddonations to out-
side spending groups.
Excluding contributions to outside spending groups, the
industry donated $367 million to party candidates and com-
mittees ($216 million [58.9%] to Republicans; $151 million
[41.1%] to Democrats), with more money going to Republi-
cans than to Democrats in all but 2 election cycles (2008 and
2010). The 2000 and 2002 election cycles, 2 of 5 cycles with
thehighest spending levels, coincidedwith congressional de-
bates on the introduction of Medicare Part D (a prescription
drug benefit program for seniors) and the 2000 presidential
election. The 2 cycles with the highest spending (2012 and
2016)werepresidential electionyears. The2018electioncycle
had the fifth highest spending.
Of the top 20 campaign contributors (Table 1), 15 were
manufacturers of biological or pharmaceutical products, and
1was the trade groupPhRMA.Theother 4wereAmerisource-
Bergen (adrugwholesalecompany),D.E.ShawResearch (abio-
chemistry research company), Pharmaceutical Product De-
velopment (a contract research organization), and SlimFast
Foods (aproducerofnutritionalanddietarysupplements).Five
pharmaceutical companies were among the top 10 spenders
forbothcampaigncontributionsand lobbying:Amgen,Eli Lilly
and Company, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, and Pfizer.
Contributions to presidential candidates totaled $22mil-
lion.TheeTable in theSupplement lists the20presidential can-
didates who received the most contributions from individu-
als andpolitical action committees in thepharmaceutical and
health product industry. Of the $19.3 million contributed to
thesecandidates, the toprecipientwasBarackObama($5.5mil-
lion), followed by Hillary Clinton ($3.7million), Mitt Romney
($3.0million), andGeorgeW. Bush ($2.4million). The next 16
candidates combined received $4.7 million.
Contributions tocongressionalcandidates totaled$214mil-
lion. Table 2 shows the top 20 recipients, in each chamber of
Congress, of contributions from individuals and political ac-
tion committees in thepharmaceutical andhealthproduct in-
dustry.These40 legislators jointly received$45million (21.0%)
of all contributions tocongressional candidates; 39weremem-
bers of committees with jurisdiction over health-related leg-
islative matters, and 24 held senior positions in these com-
mittees. Of the 20 members of the House, 17 served on the
Energy and Commerce Committee or the Ways and Means
Committee. Of the 20 senators, 13 served on the Finance
Committee.
State-Level Campaign Contributions
From1999 to2018, thepharmaceutical andhealthproduct in-
dustry contributed $877million to state-level candidates and
Figure 1. Federal-Level Lobbying Expenditures by the Pharmaceutical and Health Product Industry, 1999-2018
350
250
300
200
150
100
50
0
A
n
n
u
al
 s
p
e
n
d
in
g
, 
$
 i
n
 m
il
li
o
n
s
Year
200320011999 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 20192005
Medicare Part D
signed into law as
part of Medicare
Modernization Act
Patient Protection
and Affordable
Care Act signed
into law
2016 Presidential
election, in which
drug pricing was a
key issue Dashed lines indicate key events that
affected the pharmaceutical and
health product industry. Data from
the Center for Responsive Politics.23
Amounts were inflation adjusted to
2018 dollars using the US Consumer
Price Index.
Research Original Investigation Lobbying Expenditures and Campaign Contributions by the Drug Industry in the United States
E4 JAMA Internal Medicine Published onlineMarch 3, 2020 jamainternalmedicine.com
Downloaded From: https://jamanetwork.com/ by a London School of Economics User  on 03/05/2020
committees in 50 states and theDistrict ofColumbia, ofwhich
$661million (75.4%)went to ballotmeasure committees. The
remainder was contributed to house of representatives, as-
sembly, and senate candidates ($99million), state party com-
mittees ($72million), gubernatorial and other statewide can-
didates ($44 million), and supreme court candidates ($1
million).
Over this period, total contributions exceeded $50 mil-
lion in 2 states, California ($399 million) and Ohio ($74 mil-
lion), and were between $20 million and $50 million in 6
states—Missouri ($43 million), New York ($33 million), Or-
egon ($27 million), Florida ($26 million), Illinois ($23 mil-
lion), and Texas ($22 million). Contributions totaled $10 mil-
lion to less than $20million in 7 states, $5million to less than
Table 1. Top 20 Lobbying Spenders and Campaign Contributors in the Pharmaceutical
and Health Product Industry at the Federal Level, 1999-2018a
Rank Organizationb Expenditures, $ in millions
Lobbying spenders
1 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 422.3
2 Pfizer 219.2
3 Amgen 192.7
4 Eli Lilly and Company 166.2
5 Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO)c 153.4
6 Merck 143.0
7 Roche Holdingsc 135.9
8 Novartis 130.2
9 Johnson & Johnson 129.9
10 Sanofic 116.7
11 Bayer 111.0
12 GlaxoSmithKline 110.8
13 Bristol-Myers Squibb 101.6
14 Abbott Laboratories 96.6
15 Advanced Medical Technology Association 79.4
16 Seniors Coalition 65.3
17 Medtronic 63.8
18 Baxter International 58.4
19 AstraZeneca 54.6
20 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries 53.3
Total 2604.3
Campaign contributorsd
1 Pfizer 23.2
2 Amgen 14.7
3 Eli Lilly and Company 13.3
4 GlaxoSmithKline 12.6
5 SlimFast Foods 11.3
6 Johnson & Johnson 11.2
7 D.E. Shaw Research 11.0
8 Merck 10.6
9 Abbott Laboratories 10.0
10 Bristol-Myers Squibb 7.7
11 Exoxemis 6.9
12 McKesson 6.8
13 Ischemix 5.7
14 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 5.6
15 AstraZeneca 5.4
16 Pharmaceutical Product Development 5.2
17 Schering-Plough 5.1
18 AmerisourceBergen 4.9
19 Sanofic 4.3
20 Novartis 4.0
Total 179.5
a Data from the Center for
Responsive Politics.23 Amounts
were inflation adjusted to 2018
dollars using the US Consumer Price
Index.
bExpenditures by subsidiary
organizations were attributed to the
parent organizations. Amounts
included contributions from
organizations’ political action
committees and from individuals.
Companies that merged or were
acquired were treated as separate
entities prior to the transaction.
c BIO changed its name from
Biotechnology Industry
Organization to Biotechnology
Innovation Organization in 2016;
the figure for BIO included
expenditures under both names.
The figure for Roche Holdings
included expenditures by Roche
Group. Sanofi changed its name
from Sanofi-Aventis to Sanofi in
2011; the figures for Sanofi included
expenditures under both names.
dAmounts included contributions to
candidates, party committees, and
outside spending groups. These
figures included contributions from
organizations’ political action
committees and from individual
members, employees, or owners of
companies or organizations in an
industry or from their immediate
family members.
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$10million in 7 states, $1 million to less than $5 million in 20
states, and less than $1 million in 8 states and the District of
Columbia. Candidates and committees in California received
45.5%($399million)ofall contributions, comparedwith32.7%
($287million) for recipients in theother9 stateswith themost
contributions.
Figure 3 shows trends in contributions in the 4 states that
received the most money. Of the $399 million in contribu-
tions in California, $197 million (49.4%) and $123 million
(30.8%)were spent in 2005 and 2016, respectively; in these 2
years, there were 3 ballot measures intended to reduce drug
costs, all of whichwere rejected by voters.29-32 In 2005, 1 of 2
defeated ballot measures was Proposition 78, which PhRMA
andpharmaceutical companies supported. In theother years,
contributions in California followed cyclical patterns, reflect-
ing the timing of legislative elections. Of the $74 million do-
nated in Ohio, $61million (82.4%)was spent in 2017, the year
of a ballotmeasure aimedat loweringprescriptiondrug costs,
which was voted down.33 Of the $43 million donated in Mis-
souri, $34million (79.1%)was spent in 2006, the year of a bal-
lot measure on the legality of stem cell research, which was
passed.34 Contributions in New York followed a cyclical pat-
tern in linewith the timing of state senate and assembly elec-
tions. Trends in the other 46 states and the District of Colum-
bia generally followed thepatternobserved inNewYork,with
a few exceptions.
Discussion
From1999 to2018, thepharmaceutical andhealthproduct in-
dustry spent large sums ofmoney on lobbying and campaign
contributions. More than twice asmuchmoneywas spent on
electionsat thestate level thanat the federal level.Federal cam-
paign contributions were targeted at senior legislators serv-
ingoncongressional committees thatdrafthealthcarebills and
atpresidential candidates frombothmajorpolitical parties.At
the state level, the industry focused its effortsonopposingma-
jor drug cost-containmentmeasures by contributing to ballot
measurecommittees inkeystates.Threecost-containmentbal-
lotmeasures inCalifornia and 1 inOhiowere all defeated.30-33
In 2005, PhRMA and pharmaceutical companies supported 1
of theballotmeasures, Proposition78 inCalifornia; thepropo-
sition, which voters rejected, would have allowed pharma-
ceutical companies to voluntarily provide discounts ondrugs
sold to individuals with an income below a threshold.30
When considering legislative and policy initiatives, Con-
gress and the executive branch benefit from fully considering
Figure 2. Campaign Contributions by the Pharmaceutical and Health Product Industry to Federal (Presidential and Congressional) Elections
by Source, 1999-2018a
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Table 2. Top Recipients of Campaign Contributions From the Pharmaceutical and Health Product Industry in Congressional Elections, 1999-2018a
Rank Candidate (party, state)
Contributions received,
$ in millionsb Active years
Member of health-related
committeec
Senior member of
health-related committeed
Party
leadere
House elections
1 Eshoo, Anna (D, California) 1.8 1993-present Yesf Nog No
2 Upton, Fred (R, Michigan) 1.6 1987-present Yesf Yes No
3 Pallone, Frank (D, New Jersey) 1.5 1988-present Yesf Yes No
4 McCarthy, Kevin (R, California) 1.4 2007-present No No Yes
5 Paulsen, Erik (R, Minnesota) 1.3 2009-2019 Yesf No No
6 Ryan, Paul (R, Wisconsin) 1.3 1999-2019 Severalf Yes Yes
7 Ferguson, Mike (R, New Jersey) 1.3 2001-2009 Yesf Yes No
8 Boehner, John (R, Ohio) 1.3 1991-2015 Yes Yes Yes
9 Walden, Greg (R, Oregon) 1.2 1999-present Several Yes No
10 Shimkus, John (R, Illinois) 1.2 1997-present Yesf No No
11 Hoyer, Steny (D, Maryland) 1.1 1981-present Yesf No Yes
12 Barton, Joe (R, Texas) 1.0 1985-2019 Yesf Yes No
13 Burgess, Michael (R, Texas) 1.0 2003-present Yesf Yes No
14 Tiberi, Pat (R, Ohio) 1.0 2001-2018 Severalf Yes No
15 Dingell, John (D, Michigan) 1.0 1955-2015 Yesf Yes No
16 Lance, Leonard (R, New Jersey) 1.0 2009-2019 Yesf No No
17 Camp, Dave (R, Michigan) 1.0 1991-2015 Yesf Yes No
18 Johnson, Nancy (R, Connecticut) 0.9 1983-2007 Yesf Yes No
19 Cantor, Eric (R, Virginia) 0.9 2001-2014 Yes No Yes
20 Kind, Ron (D, Wisconsin) 0.9 1997-present Severalf No No
Total 23.7 NA 19 12 5
Senate elections
1 Hatch, Orrin (R, Utah) 2.8 1977-2019 Severalf Yes Yes
2 Burr, Richard (R, North Carolina) 1.6 2005-present Severalf Yes No
3 McConnell, Mitch (R, Kentucky) 1.4 1985-present Yesf No Yes
4 Casey, Bob (D, Pennsylvania) 1.3 2007-present Severalf Yes No
5 Clinton, Hillary (D, New York) 1.2 2001-2009 Severalf No No
6 Murray, Patty (D, Washington) 1.1 1993-present Severalf Yes No
7 Baucus, Max (D, Montana) 1.1 1978-2014 Yesf Yes No
8 Schumer, Charles (D, New York) 1.0 1999-present Yesf No Yes
9 Portman, Rob (R, Ohio) 1.0 2011-present Severalf No No
10 Specter, Arlen (R, Pennsylvania) 1.0 1981-2011 Severalf Yes No
11 Grassley, Chuck (R, Iowa) 0.9 1981-present Severalf Yes Yes
12 Menendez, Robert (D, New Jersey) 0.9 2006-present Severalf No No
13 Cornyn, John (R, Texas) 0.9 2002-present Severalf No Yes
14 Santorum, Rick (R, Pennsylvania) 0.8 1995-2007 Severalf No No
15 Wyden, Ron (D, Oregon) 0.8 1996-present Severalf Yes No
16 Harkin, Tom (D, Iowa) 0.8 1985-2015 Severalf Yes No
17 Alexander, Lamar (R, Tennessee) 0.8 2003-present Severalf Yes No
18 Toomey, Pat (R, Pennsylvania) 0.8 2011-present Severalf Yes No
19 Isakson, Johnny (R, Georgia) 0.7 2005-present Severalf Yes No
20 Reid, Harry (D, Nevada) 0.7 1987-2017 Severalf No Yes
Total 21.4 NA 20 12 6
Abbreviations: D, Democrat; NA, not applicable; R, Republican.
a The table reflects congressional positions held at any point during the study
period (January 1, 1999, through December 31, 2018). Some committees and
subcommittees changed names over the study period. Data on committee
memberships and Congressional positions were obtained from the US
Government Publishing Office.27
bData obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics.23Monetary amounts
were inflation adjusted to 2018 dollars using the US Consumer Price Index.
c See the Federal-Level Data section in theMethods section for a listing of
committees.
dThemember was the chair, vice chair, or rankingmember of at least 1
health-related committee or health-related subcommittee. See the
Federal-Level Data section in theMethods section for a listing of committees
and subcommittees.
e Themember held at least 1 party leadership position in Congress (Speaker of
the House, majority leader, minority leader, majority whip, or minority whip in
the House; president pro tempore, majority leader, minority leader, majority
whip, or minority whip in the Senate).
f Themember served on at least 1 of the selected committees and at least 1
health-related subcommittee.
gAnna Eshoo is currently chair of the Health Subcommittee in the House Energy
and Commerce Committee (2019-present).
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the interests of all parties in society, not just those who seek
to improve their access to officials through campaign contri-
butions and lobbying expenditures. In the health sector, sev-
eral organizations, notablyPhRMA, theAmericanMedicalAs-
sociation, the American Hospital Association, and the Blue
Cross Blue ShieldAssociation, accounted for a disproportion-
ate share of spending on lobbying over the study period.
PhRMA and the American Medical Association have histori-
cally lobbiedtogetheragainstgovernment interventions indrug
markets.35-38Forexample, althoughbothgroupssupported the
Affordable Care Act, they did so only after receiving commit-
ments fromtheObamaadministrationandformerSenatorMax
Baucus (D, Montana), then chair of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, that parallel import of lower-cost medicines from
Canada would not be permitted, Medicare would not be al-
lowedtonegotiatedrugprices, andMedicarepayments tophy-
sicians would not be reduced.35 With the exception of a few
influential consumer groups that have lobbied Congress to
lower drug prices—such as AARP—groups representing con-
sumers spent far less on lobbying than industry trade groups
and companies.
The $4.7 billion spent by the pharmaceutical and health
product industryon lobbyingandthe$1.3billionspentoncam-
paign contributions from1999 to 2018was only about0.1%of
the estimated $5.5 trillion (in 2018 dollars) spent on prescrip-
tion drugs in the US over the same period.39 As a percentage
of their revenues,well-resourceddrug industry groupshad to
spend relatively little in their efforts to influencepolitical and
legislative outcomes. In contrast, many organizations advo-
cating for the interests of patients and consumers have more
limited financial resources.
Legislative and regulatory changesmight address someof
thedisparitieshighlightedby thisanalysis. Suchchangesmight
include restrictions on donations by individuals and organi-
zations toballotmeasurecommitteesat thestate level.Atpres-
sent, inmany states, including California40 and Ohio,41 these
committees are not subject to contribution limits. Transpar-
encyabout financial associationsmight alsobe increased,par-
ticularly for congressional leaders and members of commit-
tees that draft legislation affecting the pharmaceutical and
health product industry and other aspects of health care. For
example, Congress could mandate that chairs and ranking
members of health-related committees publish online, in a
readily accessible manner and in a format understandable to
the electorate, records of scheduled meetings with lobbyists
from relevant industries, as is required by the European
Parliament.42
Limitations
This analysishad limitations.First, itwasnotpossible toverify
the completeness of the data. However, the nonpartisan or-
ganizations from which the data were obtained conduct ex-
Figure 3. State-Level Contributions by the Pharmaceutical and Health Product Industry to Candidates, Party Committees,
and Ballot Measure Committees in Top 4 States, 1999-2018
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From 1999 to 2018, the pharmaceutical and health product industry
contributed $399million in California, $74million in Ohio, $43million in
Missouri, and $33million in New York. Contributions from 1999 to 2002may be
underestimated because of incomplete data. Data from the National Institute
onMoney in Politics.24 Amounts were inflation adjusted to 2018 dollars using
the US Consumer Price Index.
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tensive validation and triangulation of sources to ensure
accuracy.23,24Evenso, thedatadidnot capture all lobbyingac-
tivities because some expenditures fell outside of the disclo-
sure requirements (eg, small outlays and certain indirect ex-
penses, such as investments in buildings and infrastructure).
Second, therewere inconsistenciesamongcompanies inthe
reporting of lobbying expenditures, which made it difficult to
ensure the comparability of figures. Organizations in the phar-
maceutical and health product industry report federal lobby-
ing incomes or expenditures to the SenateOffice of Public Rec-
ords through1of 3 filingmethods.23The first 2methodsadhere
to the definition of lobbying in the Internal Revenue Code (1
method for for-profit groups and 1 for nonprofit groups),43,44
whereas the third method follows the definition in the Lobby-
ing Disclosure Act of 1995.45 The 2 filingmethods based on the
InternalRevenueCodedefinition require filers todisclose state
and grassroots lobbying costs alongside federal lobbying costs,
whereastheothermethoddoesnot.Moreover, theLobbyingDis-
closure Act of 1995 definition covers a larger number of public
officials than the definition in the Internal Revenue Code.
Third, inanygivenyear, theCenter forResponsivePolitics23
and theNational Institute onMoney in Politics24were unable
to categorize approximately 30%and15%, respectively, ofdol-
lars spent on campaign contributions from individuals by in-
dustry because of lack of information. Thus, contributions at
both state and federal levels may have been underestimated
for the pharmaceutical and health product industry.24,46 The
2 organizations categorize contributions from individual do-
nors based on self-reported employment information.
Fourth, at a state level,dataon lobbyingexpenditureswere
excluded from this analysis owing to unavailability, and data
on campaign contributions from 1999 to 2002were likely un-
derestimated because of incomplete reporting. Also, state-
level data on campaign contributions excluded independent
spending (ie,money spent on communicationswith the pub-
lic by individuals or organizations that operated indepen-
dently of and not in coordination with candidates’ commit-
tees). This included spending on direct advocacy
communications (ie, “a communication, such as a website,
newspaper, TVordirectmail advertisement that expressly ad-
vocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate”47), electioneeringcommunications (ie, “anybroad-
cast, cable or satellite communication that refers to a clearly
identified…candidate, is publicly distributed within 30 days
of a primary or 60 days of a general election and is targeted to
the relevant electorate”48), and internal communications tar-
geted to members of a union or organization. Legal defini-
tions of each type of communication vary among states.
Fifth, the federal-level data only reflected campaign con-
tributions tooutside spendinggroups registeredwith theFed-
eral ElectionCommission; this excluded contributions to out-
side spending groups that report to the Internal Revenue
Service (eg, so-called 527 organizations, which can engage in
electioneering communications). The federal-level data on
campaign contributions also excluded direct advocacy com-
munications paid for by corporations out of their own trea-
suries,whichbecame legal following the ruling in the2010Su-
preme Court case of Citizens United v Federal Election
Commission26; direct advocacy communications are referred
to as independent expenditures in federal campaign finance
regulations.
Conclusions
From1999 to2018, thepharmaceutical andhealthproduct in-
dustry spent large sums ofmoney on lobbying and campaign
contributions to influence legislative and election outcomes.
Understanding the spendingof thepharmaceutical andhealth
product industryon lobbyingandcampaigncontributions can
inform discussions about how to temper the influence of in-
dustry on US health policy.
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